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REPLY TO BYU'S STATEMENTS OF THE CASE,
THE ISSUES, AND THE FACTS
Non-Parties and Movants to Intervene, Kenneth Duncan, KWD Associates,
LC, Lee Duncan, and Julee Associates, LC, (herein "Non-Parties Duncan" or
"Appellants Duncan", et al), adopt and incorporate herein all the responses and
arguments of Appellant-Defendant TREMCO Legal Solutions, Inc. in its Reply
Brief.

The facts and arguments presented by TREMCO are accurate and

supported by the record on appeal and by the authorities cited. We also rely upon
and encourage this Court to review the facts, arguments and authorities cited in the
Appellants' briefs in the B.Y.U. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110
P.3d 678, (Appeal docket #20020540), (herein "BYUv TREMCO") regarding the
denial to Non-Parties Duncan of their due process rights and the illegality of the
July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order.
Appellants Duncan, et al. object to BYU's Statements of the Facts because
Appellants' statements are replete with inaccurate, self serving innuendo and
inferences that are not supported by the actual record to which BYU cites.
Moreover, BYU's Statement of the Case is nothing more that a re-argument of
BYU's conclusions, unsupported by any record citations. And, instead of making
any substantive response to the significant constitutional issues and the denial of
due process to Appellants, BYU now argues sixteen new "issues" on appeal,
which it has improperly framed to lobby its position.
Throughout its Appellee Brief, BYU seeks to justify its June 13, 2002
Summary Judgment (now reversed) and its July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order, by

claiming new facts and legal theories that were not before the district court when
the Supplemental Order was entered.

However, a closer examination of the

substance of BYU's factual and legal arguments reveals that they really are the
same arguments that this Court already rejected. BYU merely re-packages the
same arguments with new catch-phrases. Whereas, the July 10, 2002 Supplement
Order adjudges the Non-Parties liable because they "used" BYU's license as part
of an "unincorporated association," now they are supposedly liable because
SoftSolutions, Inc. allegedly "continued to use the license in affiliation with STC,"
after dissolution. (BYU's Brief, p. 15, para 11.) BYU drops the "unincorporated
association" label but still makes the same false argument. Of course, there is no
citation to the record that supports either allegation, and no showing of any proper
legal reason why STC shareholders are personally liable for the SoftSolutions, Inc.
corporate debt.
A, THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
BYU again fails to articulate or to follow the proper standard of review
relevant to this appeal. With the illegal and unconstitutional nature of the district
court's proceedings now exposed, BYU attempts to hide behind unsupported
factual innuendo, just as it did in the district court. The applicable standard of
review in this case is the review of legal determinations by the district court and to
which this Court will not defer. BYU v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19,
f 13, 110 P.3d 678, 683. See also State v. Montoya, 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994)
("[T]he interpretation of the effect of a prior judicial decision . . . constitutes a

conclusion of law to which we accord no particular deference. Review is for
correctness."); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("[T]he effect of a
given set of facts is a question of law.").
Even aside from the clear denial of due process by the entry of the July 10,
2002 Supplemental Order, that Order was a preemptory, summary remedy, entered
without any factual hearing or opportunity for one. The claim that non-parties had
an opportunity and failed to controvert BYU's arguments prior to the
Supplemental Order is patently absurd. The district court certainly did not apply
the appropriate standard to view the facts and their inferences in the light most
favorable to the party moved against. Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc.,
740 P.2d 1304 (Utah, 1987); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co.,
627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976); see
BYUv. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, f 13.
On appeal, this Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to
Appellants and reviews for correctness whether the district court properly denied
Appellants' motion to intervene to challenge a preemptory Supplemental Order
that improperly determines the assets of the Non-Parties to be "joint assets" of an
"unincorporated association." (R. 1145, 1146) This Court should not accord the
trial court any deference because the district court ruled upon Appellants' motions
and issues as matters of law, without any evidentiary hearings. Nova Cas. Co. v.
Able Construction, 1999 UT 69, ^6, 983 P.2d 575; Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins.
Co., 2002 UT 68, f 14, 56 P.3d 524.

B. BYU'S "MARSHALING" ARGUMENT
BYU argues throughout its brief that Duncan, et al, failed to "marshal"
factual evidence in support of the district court rulings that the Non-Parties were
not denied due process by the Supplemental Order and that their motion to
intervene was properly denied," (Appellee Brief, 40-43).
BYU argues that this Court should affirm the Supplemental Order because
Appellants have not "marshaled" all of the facts to show that Judge Stott's "factual
finding" of no due process violation was clearly erroneous. Of course, the district
court's determinations and rulings were not made upon "findings" of "disputed
issues of material fact." The lower court rulings were made preemptorily, as a
matter of law. As to Non-Parties Duncan, there was never any factual finding
made of any disputed issue of material fact after any evidentiary hearing. BYU's
argument is, at best, wide of the mark.
The May 14, 2002 Ruling and the June 13, 2002 judgment against
TREMCO were decided on summary judgment. According to the district court,
there was not then any disputed fact. This court held in BYU v Tremco that even
under these "undisputed" facts, BYU could not prevail. There was not any new,
significant evidence to support the language of the Supplemental Order.
The July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order is wholly dependant upon the May
14, 2002 Ruling.

This preemptory enforcement order purports to adjudicate,

without so much as notice or an opportunity to be heard, the ownership and
liability of the personal assets (e.g. the STC stock sale proceeds) owned by Non-

Parties Duncan. The Supplemental Order says that the stock sale proceeds of
KWD Associates, LC and Julee Associates, LC are the joint assets of the nonexistent "Softsolutions association." This July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order is in
no better position than the now-vacated summary judgment. Consistent with the
standard of review on summary judgment, this court must "review the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party." Regal Ins, Co. v. Bott, 2001 UT 71,\ 2, 31 P.3d 524. Summary
enforcement, like summary judgment, is only proper when "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact." Utah R, Civ, P. 56(c). In all summary enforcement
proceedings, the district court did not resolve any factual issue by making
"findings." The district court's stated "findings" in its Supplemental Order are not
findings of disputed facts after testimony and witnesses. Indeed, Appellants were
never afforded any due process opportunity to dispute anything.
BYU's reliance on Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 100 P.3d 1177 does not
support its "marshaling" argument. The requirements of the process depend upon
the context in which it is applied. Id. at f 25. In this case, the context is that of a
summary judgment against non-parties, adjudicating the ownership of their assets
without notice or an opportunity to defend—a far cry from Chen.
BYU's efforts to create a bogus requirement to "marshal" merely
demonstrates BYU's inability to argue any valid, substantive defense for the July
10, 2002 Supplemental Order. Moreover, BYU's claim that the district court
subsequently made factual findings is patently false. The mere labeling of a ruling

or determination as a "finding" does not make it one. Regardless of its label, a
finding of fact that is actually a conclusion of law, will be treated as a conclusion
of law. A conclusion of law, albeit labeled a "finding of fact," will be reviewed by
this Court for correctness. Zions First Nat, Bank, N.A. v. National American Title
Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 656

(Utah 1988). And, when asserted "findings of fact"

are made on issues not raised in the pleadings, the findings will be considered
nugatory and without effect, providing no support for the judgment reviewed.
Maynard v. Locomotive Engineers' Mutual Life & Accident Ins, Ass'n, 14 Utah
458, 47 P. 1030, 1031 (Utah 1897).
Appellants do not just challenge the district court's Supplemental Order for
its lack of supporting evidence in the record (albeit such is the case). Appellants
challenge the July 10 Supplemental Order as a matter of law because it was
entered summarily without due process, without any opportunity to be named,
heard, or to defend. The Order divested Appellants of valid and valuable personal
property rights. That denial of due process has never been remedied or cured.
Without any support or rational explanation, BYU argues that Appellants
Duncan, et al may not challenge Fourth District court Judge Howard's July 10,
2002 Supplemental Order without first "marshaling" the record with respect to
evidence and materials argued later to Fourth District Court Judge David Stott.
Even evidence presented after the fact to Judge Stott does not satisfy the due
process right to be heard and to defend that is required before entry of the
preemptory order by a prior judge. Declaring "we're all bound by that order . . .",

Judge Stott would not look behind the Supplemental Order or even reconsider its
validity. (R. 8579, p. 33, 35). Judge Stott determined that the Supplemental Order
was "the law of the case." (R. 8580, p.80).
This Court's determination of the violations of due process should be a
legal question. State v. Werner, 2003 UT App 268, ff 10-11, 76 P.3d 204 (stating
that the voluntariness of a confession under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is a legal question reviewed for correctness.

The

marshaling of all the evidence is not required).
C. BYU'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
All of BYU's asserted facts and efforts to re-wrap the nature of the
proceedings below are so interlaced with unsupported innuendo and inaccuracy as
to render their entire statement totally lacking in credibility.

As noted by

Appellant Tremco in its Reply Brief, the inaccuracies and misrepresentations by
BYU are too numerous to list or fully discuss. Further examples, of BYU's false
assertions include:
1.

BYU is "entitled to enforce the Softsolutions Judgment against the

WordPerfect Proceeds based upon the findings made by Judge Howard as further
supplemented by Judge Stott." BYU's brief, pp. 10-11.
There was never any "evidentiary" hearing regarding BYU's arguments
that the STC stock shares owned and sold by Non-Parties Duncan were assets of
SoftSolutions, Inc. in 1994. Neither Judge Howard, nor Judge Stott, properly
made "findings." There has never been any factual finding based upon admissible

evidence that the STC stock shares were owned by SoftSolutions, Inc when
SoftSolutions, Inc. dissolved in 1992, or when KWD Associates and Julee
Associates sold their STC shares to WordPerfect in 1994. Indeed, until now, BYU
has always claimed that these assets of Appellants Duncan, et al, were the "joint"
assets of the "unincorporated association." BYU now attempts to "repackage" its
previously rejected argument.
2.

BYU's "Addendum X"

BYU presents no record evidence that actually supports its assertion that
the nonparty STC's stock was still owned by Softsolutions, Inc at the time of the
1994 stock sale to WordPerfect.

BYU improperly refers the Court to an

Addendum "X", a document dehors the record on appeal which this Court will not
consider. Flick v. VanTassell, 547 P.2d 204 (Utah 1976); Douglas v. District
Court of Salt Lake County, 45 Utah 486, 146 Pac. 562, 564 (1915) BYU
apparently believes that if it shouts often enough, then this Court will eventually
believe its claim to be true.
Exhibit X, in its entirety, is not a "public record." Moreover, BYU fails to
disclose other associated corporate documents plainly rebutting BYU's assertions
and showing that all STC Stock was owned by KWD, Julee and AST as of April,
1990, which was even before the July, 1990 license agreement between BYU and
SoftSolutions, Inc.

3.

Among other false "facts" argued by BYU, the following conclusory

determinations in the July 10th Supplemental Order were not supported by BYU's
evidence:
a.

Appellants Duncan, et al and STC "continued to carry on the
Corporation's [SoftSolutions, Inc] business through use of the
Corporation's assets .. . ." (Supp Order, para 4, R. 1149);

b.

"The

dissolved

Corporation,

Duncan,

Duncan,

and

Tedjamulia and STC continued to market products under the
license agreements which were in the name of the
Corporation." (Supp Order, para 5, R. 1148);
c.

There existed, "[i]n 1996, the unincorporated association,
which then consisted of at least Duncan, Duncan and
Tedjamulia and the dissolved corporation . . . ."; (Supp Order,
para. 11, R. 1147);

d.

The 1998 SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment was entered against
the

"unincorporated

association."

The

"unincorporated

association appealed" and the 1998 judgment was affirmed by
this Court against said "association." (Supp Order, para 12,
13, R. 1147-46);
e.

The STC stock and stock sale proceeds, owned by nonparties
KWD Associates, LC and Julee Associated, LC, were the

"joint property of all associates of the unincorporated
association
f.

" (Supp Order, para 17, R. 1145);

SoftSolution, Inc.'s "assets included the license rights and
products which belonged to the Corporation but which
Duncan, Duncan and Tedjamulia caused to be transferred to
WordPerfect . . ." at the time of the 1994 stock sale of STC.
(Supp Order, para 21, R. 1144).

4.

BYU's Allegation of "Evidentiary Hearings."

BYU falsely claims that the district court held "evidentiary hearings,"
commencing on June 3, 2003. There was no such hearing. In fact, Appellant and
non-party Kenneth Duncan and Alvin Tedjamulia were subpoenaed and ordered to
appear and be examined in "supplemental proceedings," with their examination
limited to the proceeds of the 1994 STC stock sale to WordPerfect. (R. 4077,
4167)

The district court ordered Appellants to appear and to answer BYU's

questions as to their assets, despite Appellants' pending motions for stay of
execution of the Supplemental Order, to intervene, and to set aside that Order.
(R.1477, 1470, 1488; R. 8579, pp.26, 31-33). Appellant Duncan appeared and
testified as ordered. (R. 4934, 4935). Mr. Tedjamulia appeared and testified as
ordered. (R. 4936).

Each was represented by his attorney during their

examinations. Counsel for Tremco and SoftSolutions, Inc. were also present. But,
these were not "evidentiary hearings," and neither Duncan nor Tedjamulia was
allowed to assert the invalidity and unconstitutionality of the July 10, 2002

Supplemental Order during these supplemental proceeding examinations. Later,
the district court refused to consider any claim by Non-Parties Duncan that the
Supplemental Order was flawed and illegally entered.

"All supplemental

proceedings does is allow inquiry with respect to information to satisfy judgment."
(R.8579, p. 35; also, R. 8580, p.80)
The transcripts of Duncan's supplemental examinations as to his assets did
not exist at the time of the entry of the July, 2002 Supplemental Order. The
transcripts were not considered by the district court at the time of August 22, 2003
argument and the denials of Appellants5 motions to intervene and for stay.
Notwithstanding, Ken Duncan testified

multiple times during his

examination that the stock shares of STC were owned by KWD Associates, LC,
Julee Associates, LC, and AST Associates, LC at the time those STC shares were
sold to WordPerfect Corporation in 1994 in a stock-sale transaction. (R. 4934, p.
28, 45; R. 4935, pp.6, 79-82, 87, 90-91) These assets were owned by those STC
shareholders and not by SoftSolutions, Inc. There was no admissible evidence in
the record to the contrary.

Even if the record shows just "one scintilla" of

evidence contrary to BYU's new claim that SoftSolutions, Inc. owned the STC
stock at the time of the stock's sale in 1994, then the preemptory July, 2002
Supplemental Order would be defeated by a disputed issue of a material fact.
5.

BYU's statement that the July 10, 2002 "Supplemental Order does

not hold Duncan, et al. personally liable for the SoftSolutions Judgment" is
patently false. (BYU's brief at 62.)

In addition to improperly and illegally adjudicating Duncan, et al.'s assets
to be assets of the fictional "unincorporated association," there is no question that
July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order separately imposes joint and several in
personam liability upon Non-Parties Duncan, et al. Paragraph 24 of the Order
recites: "[T]he Court hereby concludes that the shareholders of the Corporation
[SoftSolutions, Inc.], including Duncan, Duncan, and Tedjamulia, are jointly liable
for the debts and obligations incurred by the unincorporated association." (R.
1043 (emphasis added).) Indeed, this Court has already recognized that the July
10, 2002 Order "extend[s] liability for the SoftSolutions judgment to the Duncan
individuals and entities." BYU v. Tremco, 2005 UT 19, ^ 10. BYU's attempts to
now narrow the unconstitutional overreaching are without merit.
REPLY ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JULY 10, 2002 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER IS VOID AND
SHOULD BE VACATED BASED UPON THE BYU V. TREMCO
DECISION.
BYU has not provided any substantive or meaningful reason why this
Court's decision in BYU v. Tremco Consultants Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678
reversing the June 13, 2002 Summary Judgment, does not also apply to the July
10, 2002 Supplemental Order. The district court's May 14, 2002 memorandum
ruling is the factual and legal foundation for the entire July 10, 2002 Supplemental
Order.

Disingenuously, BYU now tries to distance its July 10, 2002 Supplemental
Order and its voluminous collection proceedings from the now-reversed May 14,
2002 Ruling and the vacated June 13, 2002 Summary Judgment. BYU seeks to
package itself as a simple judgment creditor just following SoftSolutions, Inc.
corporate assets. All of BYU's actions since Judge Howard's May 14, 2002
Ruling (R. 1052) are highly dependent upon that ruling and its erroneous
applications of the law to the "undisputed" facts.

Each of the legal theories

applied in the June 13, 2002 Judgment and in the July 10 Supplemental Order as
the bases for non-party liability were reversed by this Court in B. Y. U. v. Tremco
Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19, 110 P.3d 678. These are the very same theories
that BYU continued to use to assert liability upon the non-party STC shareholders
for the SoftSolutions, Inc. corporate debt. The entire July 10, 2002 Supplemental
Order against the Non-Parties Duncan relies upon and applies these same rejected
legal theories - specifically, the specious "unincorporated association," joint
shareholder liability, fraudulent transfer, res judicata - to personally bind
Duncans, et al.
The July 10th Supplemental Order is illegal and void as to non-parties
Duncan because:
a.

There is no legal basis for an "incorporated Association." (110 P.3d
678,1J17-18) Therefore, paragraphs 4, 11, 12, 13, 17, 19 and 24 of
the Supplemental Order, and the "finding" that Duncans are
members of the "association" also fail.

b.

Non-parties Duncan are not liable for the SoftSolutions, Inc.
judgment by reason of res judicata. (110 P.3d 678, f 35) Therefore,
paragraphs 4, 7,14, 17, 21 of the Supplemental Order cannot bind
these non-parties to the corporate judgment.

c.

As separate corporate entities, SoftSolutions, Inc., and STC, are
separate and distinct from their officers and shareholders.

That

separate identity is observed and no "alter ego" was alleged or
proved by BYU. Officers and stockholders are not in privity with
their corporations and are not personally bound to pay the
SoftSolutions, Inc. judgment. (110 P.3d 678, % 37-38) Therefore,
there is no "alter ego" liability against Non-Party Duncans.
d.

There was no evidence before the district court that Tremco
Consultants, Inc. "fraudulently" received a transfer of an asset of
SoftSolutions, Inc. (110 P.3d 678, ^f 23). There was no evidence
before the district court that any Appellant "fraudulently" received
transfer of any SoftSolutions, Inc. asset or any STC asset. There was
only the argument and innuendo from BYU. There is no undisputed
evidence to support paragraphs 3-5, 12, 21, and 22 of the
Supplemental Order (R. 1151-1145).

When a trial court has based its ruling on a misunderstanding and
misapplication of the law, and a correct application would produce a different
result, Appellants are adversely affected and are entitled to have the error rectified

in a proper adjudication under correct principles of law.

Hoffman v. Life

Insurance Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410 (Utah 1983); Reed v Alvey, 610
P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) (decided under "equity" standards of review).

The

Supplemental Order is so reliant upon and interrelated with the district court's
misapplication of the law that the entire Order should be deemed vacated by the
BYU v. TREMCO decision. Every order since the May 13, 2002 Ruling that has
allowed BYU to enforce the SoftSolutions, Inc. corporate debt against the nonparties should be vacated. The reversal of the June 13, 2002 judgment should
have returned the case to the point prior to the entry of the summary judgment, as
if it had never been entered. Murray v. Murray, 856 P.2d 463 (Alaska 1993);
Russell v. Board of Country Commissioners, 952 P.2d 492 (Ok. 1997).

All

enforcement proceedings subsequent to the reversed summary judgment should be
vacated. Phebus v. Dunford, 114 Utah, 292, 294, 198 P.2d 973, 974 (1948).
POINT II
THE DENIAL OF NON-PARTY DUNCAN'S MOTION TO
INTERVENE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND WAS NOT
WAIVED BY APPELLANTS' SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS TO
CHALLENGE BYU'S ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST
APPELLANTS
Before the entry of the July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order, the district court
never conducted any evidentiary hearing. The July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order
significantly alters the character and extent of the original 1998 SoftSolutions Inc.
Judgment and extends liability to Non-Parties Duncan adjudicating their assets to
be assets of the debtor corporation. This was all done without due process.

After entry of the July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order, there was never any
hearing, nor any finding entered, on any fact regarding the liability of Non-Parties
Duncan or the ownership of their assets under the Supplemental Order. There was
not any re-consideration or re-determination of whether Non-Parties Duncan could
properly be bound by the May 14, 2002 Ruling (now vacated), or by the
Supplemental Order. The district court's later determination that Appellants were
not denied due process was not a finding based upon any evidentiary hearing, but
was a legal conclusion premised upon the same legal theories that this Court has
already rejected.1 Appellants were never parties, named or served, prior to the
issuance of the Supplemental Order and the imposition of liability upon their
property. BYU v. Tremco, 2005 UT 19, f43, 110 P.3d 678, 690. They were
denied their right to intervene to defend their property. They should have been
allowed to intervene as a matter of right to protect their own individual and
separate property interests under Rule 24(a), Utah R. Civil Proc.
BYU's arguments are that Appellants Duncans had adequate opportunity
under then-Rule 69 to request a hearing upon execution, and that Duncans have
"informally" intervened by their opposing each of BYU's execution and
1

The district court stated, "I do not perceive that the [July 10, 2002 Supplemental
Order] improperly expands the BYU judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. or the
judgment against Tremco. From my perspective in reviewing all of the
information and listening to the arguments it is this Court's finding and
perspective that it only provided an opportunity for collection of the judgment
from the proceeds of the sale that could be properly executed on by reason of the
proper identity of the companies and individuals. . . . I believe that Judge
Howard's ruling and the observations he made in that ruling with respect to the
support of his findings are proper and will remain the law of the case." July 22,
2003 Hrg., R. 8580, p. 80.

enforcement proceedings. BYU also argues there is no right to intervene because
the district court has already ruled that Appellants' assets (e.g. the WordPerfect
stock sale proceeds) are really SoftSolution's, Inc. assets. (Appellee's Brief at pp.
32-39).
BYU's arguments are nothing more than "bootstrapping." As discussed,
Judge Stott did not conduct a "full rehearing." He did not hear any witness or
schedule an evidentiary hearing. The court did nothing more than enforce the July
10 Supplemental Order on its face, stating that the non-parties could be adequately
protected by a Rule 69 hearing. The court failed to address that under former Rule
69, Utah R. Civil Proc. (now part of Rule 64E(c), Utah R. Civil Proc.) any such
hearing and resulting inquiry would be limited to whether the property being taken
could be traced to the proceeds of the STC stock sale. (See Rannoch Hearing, R.
8582, pp. 109-110) The court has not allowed any determination of the ownership
of the STC Stock shares, applying the correct principles of law. Reed v. Alvey,
610 P.2d at 1377.

There has not been any reconsideration or determination

whether the STC Stock was a "joint asset" of an "unincorporated association," or
whether there was any "fraudulent transfer" as BYU alleged against Tremco
Consulting, Inc. A Rule 69 post-attachment hearing did not provide any adequate
means to be heard as to the merits or the district court's errors.
Non-parties Duncan have never "intervened informally."

Appellants

Duncan, et al have never been permitted a full and fair hearing on the validity of
the July 10 Supplemental Order as BYU suggests.

BYU argues that the

continuing objections filed by Non-Party Duncans to BYU's numerous execution
proceedings constitute a de facto "intervention." Ken Duncan, Lee Duncan, KWD
Associates, LC and Julee Associates, LC have been forced repeatedly to object to
and

defend

against

numerous

post

judgment

proceedings

by

BYU.

Notwithstanding, Appellants have never been properly named or served in the
original proceeding wherein their property has been taken by the Supplemental
Order. BYU's characterizations to the contrary are false.
Since the July 10 Supplemental Order was entered, without notice or
chance to defend, Appellants Duncan, et al.:
1.

Filed their motion to intervene, motion for stay and motion to
set aside the Supplemental Order, with supporting affidavits
of Kenneth Duncan, Neil Sabin and Alvin Tedjamulia and
memoranda. (R. 1470, 1477, 1488, 1452, 1391)

2.

Received writs of garnishment served against their personal
bank accounts at Bank of American Fork and Merrill Lynch.
(R. 2557, 2581, 2732)

3.

Filed Motions to Quash and objections to the garnishment
writs and subpoenas directed to their personal accounts. (R.
2718,2685,2744,2762).

4.

Defended against BYU's post-Supplemental Order subpoenas
against KWD Associates, LC, Julee Associates, LC and Ken
Duncan. (R. 3629, 3690, 3848, 3868, 4213)

Appeared on June 3, 2003 pursuant to subpoenas and the
district court's order. (R. 4077, 4170, 4167, 4374).
On July 22, 2003 argued their motions to intervene, for stay
and to set aside the Supplemental Order. (R. 8580)
Objected to BYU's submitted Orders denying Appellants'
motions. (R. 4962, 5016)
Joined in the motion of another non-party to approve alternate
security and to stay enforcement of the Supplemental Order.
(R. 5734)
Received BYU's subpoenas of Duncan's personal accounts at
Bank One and Zions Bank. (R. 5783, 5831, 5852)
Received BYU's subpoenas directed to Heber Valley Bank
and Goldman, Sacs Group Inc., and a garnishment to
Manulife, Inc.
Appeared at a hearing to join in and argue Motions to Quash
Executions and a renewed Motion for Alternate Security. (R.
6582)
Moved and argued to set aside a sale of property BYU
claimed was owned by KWD Associates, LC.

(R. 6706,

6708,7197,7200)
Filed on August 30, 2004 a Motion to Strike BYU's attempt
to amend its Tremco Complaint, which "amendment" was

rejected by the Fourth District Court on September 21, 2004,
when all pending motions were "stayed" by the district court.
14.

Appeared and defended

against the November,

2004

complaint-in-intervention by Heber Valley Bank and BYU's
cross-claim regarding the interests of that bank in property
owned by non-party Carie, LLC.
Since denial of their Motion to Intervene, Motion for Stay and Motion to
Set Aside the July 10 Supplemental Order, the non-parties Duncan have acted only
to respond to and defend against the numerous BYU collections efforts filed
against the personal assets of Kenneth and Marie Duncan and against KWD
Associates, LC. Appellants' resistance of BYU's considerable collection attempts
- attempts which are unconstitutional and illegal - certainly preserve Appellants'
claims that they are being deprived of their property without due process.
Appellants' resistance of BYU's attempts to collect from our personal assets does
not constitute Appellants general "appearance," in the action informal or
otherwise. Neither does it cure the due process violations. Appellants have never
been allowed their right to answer to specific allegations or to be heard in an
impartial, full and fair hearing on the merits of BYU's claim that Appellants'
assets should be the assets of the corporate debtor, SoftSolutions, Inc.
Finally, BYU's argument that the motion to intervene is now moot or not
meritorious because the district court has now so ruled only "begs the question."
If, as BYU argues, the district court has ruled that the July 10 Supplemental Order

is not enforceable against the "personal assets" of the Appellants then the entire
matter should be decided adversely to BYU, because the STC stock and its sale
proceeds were and are the personal assets of KWD Associates, LC and Julee
Associates, LC.

And, if the interests of Appellants have been adequately

represented by TREMCO, as BYU has argued, then this Court's TREMCO
decision also decides this appeal in Appellants' favor and vacates the
Supplemental Order.
The STC stock shares were owned and sold by the STC stockholders of
record—Appellants KWD Associates and Julee Associates. The STC shares were
not an asset of SoftSolutions, Inc. when that company dissolved in 1992 or when
the STC stock was sold in 1994. BYU cannot lawfully collect a corporate debt
from its shareholders without first making the shareholders parties, stating BYU's
claims by complaint against them, and allowing those shareholders their due
process to answer, defend and be heard. This BYU has never done. Appellants'
motion to intervene, showing that the July 10, 2002 Supplemental Order was void,
should have been granted.
CONCLUSION
The gravamen of each of the appeals and writ proceedings before this Court
is that Appellants and their separate assets (including any proceeds of the sale of
their STC shares of stock) were not, and are not, the assets of SoftSolutions, Inc.,
the corporate judgment debtor. BYU has not, and cannot, show otherwise when
the relevant legal principles are properly applied to this case.

Most particularly under our Constitutions, if BYU desires to make a claim,
then Appellants are entitled to the basic due process of having BYU's claim
against them properly stated, and be given proper notice, the right to appear and
defend, and the right to a full and fair adjudication under proper legal principles.
The entry of the 2002 Supplemental Order which deprived Appellants' of their
property was clearly error. Appellants should have been allowed to intervene, as a
matter of right, to show the district court its error and to obtain a correct
adjudication.
At this point in the proceedings, regardless of whether Appellants'
intervention is allowed or not, this Court should reverse and vacate the July 10,
2002 Supplemental Order as void.
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